



Towards measured boot out of the box

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Security of the boot chain is vital

UEFI Secure Boot

Various embedded solutions

Rely on security of firmware

No way to prove verification happened

Why does this matter?

Compromised servers

Modified laptops

Can't protect against hardware attacks

...but we can cover most others

Trusted Platform Module

Small chip

Platform Configuration Registers

Measurement

$$\text{PCR}_{\text{new}} = \text{hash}(\text{PCR}_{\text{old}} \parallel \text{hash}(\text{data}))$$

Associated log

Trusted GRUB

(old and busted)

Rohde & Schwarz

(no UEFI support, not TPM2 support)

<https://github.com/coreos/grub>

What do we measure?

Traditional approach

Most components in separate PCR's

Need to re-use PCRs

Order of loading matters

Unimportant configuration changes alter values

Suboptimal

Use the logfile

Replay log to ensure it's valid

Look at individual log entries

Two choices

Log entry contains description of binary and
hash of binary

Log entry contains text and hash of text

Policy describes each binary

Policy describes regular expressions

Where does the policy come from?

CoreOS builds policy automatically on OS release

Problems:

Initramfs varies across systems

Reproducible initramfs builds

Generic initramfs

Where do we store boot data?

Use UEFI variables

Use TPM

Things to use the TPM for:

TPMTOTP

Disk encryption keys

SSH keys

Unseal/reseal

Doesn't TXT make all of this easier?

(ha ha ha)

No secure boot support

Incompatible with runtime UEFI

Summary:

Ship bootloader support
Ship known-good measurements
Integration with firmware updates
Deterministic initramfs generation